In this essay I will argue that Brexit -the vote for Britain to leave the European Union -has enacted a fundamental shift in British politics and society which poses significant challenges for Critical Management Studies (CMS) in Britain, and possibly even marks its death knell. It is intended as a provocation to debate and as such many will strongly disagree, or at least feel uncomfortable, with it. Perhaps that disagreement will, even, be a springboard for CMS academics and activists to respond to Brexit in ways I have not anticipated and thereby prove me wrong in my diagnosis.
more), that is certainly consistent with my own sense from numerous conversations with such people.
Not only did Brexit put CMS and MMS academics on the same side, it also put CMS on the same side as the vast majority of big business and financial capital, whose leaders and representative bodies were virtually unanimous in their desire to remain within the EU (as were most leaders and representative bodies of universities and business schools). If that seems an uncomfortable and ironic positioning to critical academics, then it would not seem so to many Brexiters. The leitmotif of the populist Brexit campaign and result was that it was an anti-elitist rebellion, and the elite referred to consists quite as much, and perhaps more, of the intellectual elite as it does of the corporate elite. Indeed, both are subsumed, and disdained, under the label of the 'liberal elite'.
There is a need for considerable scepticism about this, of course. The leave campaign was fronted almost entirely by figures who by normal reckonings would be considered part of the elite in terms of educational and class background, and, in most cases were both socially liberal, economically liberal or both. Examples include the de facto leader of the official Leave Campaign, Boris Johnson, educated at Eton and Oxford. This leads to many complexities and ironies for what Brexit will mean, which I will discuss later.
But even if we are sceptical about the non-elite credentials of its leaders, the leave vote is widely interpreted as having been driven to some large degree by the wrath of those 'left behind' by globalization, especially as regards employment and conditions of employment (Warhurst, 2016) . Paralleling Trump's core vote in rust belt America, the archetype of the Brexit voter is someone from the white working class, living in England but outside of Greater London and most big cities, in regions which have been substantially de-6 industrialized over several decades 1 . Indeed this has become pretty much the standard diagnosis of Brexit, and of nationalist populism more generally (e.g. Hochschild, 2016; Inglehart & Norris, 2016) .
The evidence of the voting patterns bears this out to a considerable extent. It was in those regions of England that the leave vote was strongest, and it was amongst the lower social classes, lowest education, lowest employment rate and lowest income groups that the leave vote was strongest; and amongst those who thought that globalization was 'a force for ill', 69% voted to leave (Lord Ashcroft Polls, 2016 ). However, it should not be ignored that there were plenty of more prosperous, middle-class people and areas that voted to leave.
Moreover, statistics about the income, employment and educational levels of leavers are to an extent skewed by the fact that age was also closely correlated with voting to leave. Thus retired voters will also show up as economically inactive, on lower incomes (i.e. pensions) and, because they pre-dated the large-scale expansion of post-compulsory and higher education, as less educated.
So there are caveats to be made to the broad picture, but it still remains the case that the vote opened up a large chasm based on social class and education, and within that chasm CMS academics (like academics in general) are likely to have been on the remain side and therefore stand in opposition to largely working-class voters 2 . But this is not just about economic marginalization. The vote also showed a profound division on social and political issues. Specifically, the populism associated with Brexit is explicable not just in terms of the economic insecurity associated with economic liberalism but also as part of a 'cultural backlash' against social liberalism (Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2009) found even amongst those who do not suffer as a result of economic liberalism and may even benefit from it.
Thus the referendum vote showed that around 80% of people who thought that multiculturalism, social liberalism, the green movement and immigration were 'forces for ill' voted to leave the EU, as did about 74% of people who thought feminism was a force for ill. 
CMS, the EU and the Liberal-Left
To the extent that the Brexit can indeed be understood as a response to neo-liberal globalization by its discontents and victims -and with the caveats I have made, this can't be ignored as one important part of the explanation -and to the extent that CMS academics were opposed to Brexit it poses an obvious problem for CMS. Parker's (2013: 177) evocation of the CMS political big tent depicts it as being "in sympathy with a wide range of critiques of capitalism, patriarchy and imperialism ... which might include … anti-capitalist protestors, shareholder activists, trade unionists, environmental campaigners, ethical investors and those who care about slow food, local money …". So if CMS has this anti-neo-liberal globalization, pro-localism politics, how come it is on the 'wrong side' of Brexit?
This question is not unique to CMS, of course. In various ways they exist for the wider British liberal-left of which CMS is to some degree a species. There has long been a Left critique of the EU for precisely the reason that it can be seen as an aspect of neo-liberal globalization. However, many other parts of the British Left had long ago come to the view that the EU offered the best way of controlling the neo-liberal ascendancy within the UK, so strong since 1980s Thatcherism, especially in the aftermath of the collapse of communism. More generally, from this perspective the EU could be seen as a tentative step towards if not global then at least regional regulation of capital. Freedom of movement for labour was a particularly important aspect of this, because it at least gave labour some of the rights of international mobility that would otherwise be restricted to capital and in any case sat well with the traditional internationalism of many parts of the liberal-left. That, of course, was a significant fault-line in the Brexit debate since this unrestricted immigration for EU citizens was a major argument made for leaving. It is for this reason that, again at the time of writing, the British Labour Party remains split between those, including its leadership, who support hard Brexit and those who wish to see either a soft Brexit (remaining within the European single market) or no Brexit at all.
What this adds up to, then, is that for CMS as for many on the liberal-left, working class voters were asking the right question but gave the 'wrong answer'. If emancipation from oppression and opposition to neo-liberal globalization (exemplified by the financial crisis) are the hallmarks of CMS then the working class has decided to emancipate itself by embracing nativism (often with a racist element), populism, nationalism and illiberalism.
That wasn't the answer that CMS would give, not least since it is likely to be highly selfdefeating for those 'left behind by globalization' because for reasons I will expand upon shortly they are likely to be the biggest losers from Brexit.
Such prognostications are unlikely to cut much ice with leave voters, though. They are just a species of the 'Project Fear' rhetoric found in the mouths of Conservative politicians and, again, the elite. There are only very limited signs (at the time of writing: October 2017) of any regret on the part of leave voters, and very little evidence that they would acquiesce to the idea that they gave the 'wrong answer'. Instead, there is a strong sense of having 'put two fingers up' at the massed ranks of the elite, the establishment and the 'experts' -a grouping that includes 'us', CMS academics. In the now highly polarised politics of Brexit Britain there is therefore a strong temptation for us to return the gesture. Unless we are to globalization, social liberalism, and the liberal elite. In this sense, it can be regarded as a vote against many of the things that CMS stands for. Even where there might be common ground -opposition to neo-liberal globalization -the form that this took in Brexit was not that of CMS, and the opposition to social liberalism is an outright rejection of CMS politics.
Because Brexit has polarised British politics into two sides there is no place for a middle ground (at least not amongst those who are politically engaged) 4 . CMS, like it or not, is in the same camp as business, MMS and the socially liberal elite. It might be objected that it is not necessary for CMS to diverge from all aspects of MMS and business in order to retain its critical identity. But that is to overlook the fundamental binary divide of Brexit as the defining meta-issue of British politics. Similarly, it might, as one anonymous reviewer of this paper suggested, be objected CMS is also in the same camp as academics in physics, antiquity scholars or any other disciplines and so being also with MMS is neither here nor there. But, of course, CMS doesn't define itself in contrast to all those disciplines; it does so in contrast to MMS, its "Big Other" as (Parker 2002: 120) puts it. That can't be sustained if on the biggest and most divisive issue for many decades CMS and its other are indistinguishable.
I think this means that CMS in the UK is now in a significantly different political terrain to that which obtained since it emerged in the 1990s, and this makes it unclear how it can operate. One position would be to align with those who continue to seek 'Lexit', but that means working in isolation from the most powerful parts of the emergent anti-Brexit coalition 5 . These include many business leaders, university leaders, journalists, think tanks, 4 It's not my focus here, but it's worth saying that is not just CMS and the liberal-left whose politics have been redefined by Brexit. Consider the position of the (many) pro-EU Conservatives who now belong to a party which is pursuing a policy at odds with the vast majority of its traditional support base in business and finance. 5 A piece such as this is always liable to date -rapidly, given the unpredictable politics of Brexit. It is therefore possible that a Labour government will form and pursue Lexit. That possibility may have some purchase. The binary polarization of the referendum may soften in time. In particular, it is possible that the fissures on the Brexit side between its globalist and economically liberal leaders and the nationalism and protectionism of many of its supporters will fracture that side of the argument. That then also makes it easier for a range of anti-Brexit positions to be articulated. It certainly seems reasonable to think that as the process of leaving the EU unfolds the consequences are highly unpredictable, so precise predictions are probably foolish.
Even so, at the moment I think the grounds for optimism are slim. No doubt there will continue to be a place for critical papers about managerialism, handbooks, conferences, and so on. And no doubt there are many individuals who affiliate with CMS for whom Brexit is unproblematic or indeed irrelevant (to repeat, it is not my argument and it is not necessary to my argument that all CMS academics are opposed to Brexit). But understood in terms of its broad political project the omens for British CMS are not good. CMS has always stood in means for CMS, but in complex ways given that, at present, Labour is drawing electoral support from both nativist Brexiters in some of its traditional heartlands and younger, urban remainers. Thus the same basic binary sides will persist, albeit in a different context to that of a Conservative government. Moreover, even is Brexit is somehow abandoned altogether, the scars and divisions will endure. some way -complex, qualified, contested and varied, no doubt -for a politics that favours the marginalised, the oppressed, and the powerless against the privilege and power of the elite (Adler, 2002; Murphy et al, 2013; Parker, 2013) . Unfortunately, the marginalised, oppressed and powerless have in large numbers voted against much that CMS believes in and positioned CMS as part of a privileged and powerful elite establishment which they despise: perhaps that was always so, but Brexit makes it explicit and unavoidable. If CMS is to work effectively as part of an anti-Brexit coalition it will have to work as part of that elite establishment, which inevitably involves compromising and diluting its criticality. It may be that British CMS academics and activists will find new and creative ways to articulate CMS in the post-Brexit landscape that I am unable to see. I hope so. But I suspect that in retrospect CMS in Britain will be remembered, if at all, as a curious artefact of a period bookended by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the populist wave of 2016.
